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Canada has long been one of the most important trading
partners for the United States.' Canada, primarily British
Columbia, is the second most important international trading
partner of Washington State.2 In 1986, trade between Wash-
ington and Canada exceeded $3.5 billion dollars.
This trade relationship will be enhanced by the fact that
both the United States Senate and the Canadian Parliament
have ratified the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement,
which went into effect on January 1, 1989.' By its terms, this
agreement drastically reduces or eliminates tariffs on com-
merce between the two nations within the next ten years.5 As
a result, the ratification signals the beginning of a period of
increased commercial activity between American and Canadian
business people.6 This is particularly true between Washington
and British Columbia where tariffs have prevented competi-
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1. Washington State Dep't of Trade and Economic Dev., The Canada Connection,
Vol. 1, No. 1 TEAM WASHINGTON NEWS 10 (Summer 1989) [hereinafter Canada
Connection, Part 1].
2. Id.
3. Id. at 10-11. This figure is in United States dollars. The only nation with which
Washington has a greater volume of trade is Japan. Washington State Dep't of Trade
and Economic Dev., The Canada Connection, Vol. 1, No. 2 TEAM WASHINGTON NEWS 1,
12 (Fall 1989) [hereinafter Canada Connection, Part 2].
4. Canada Connection, Part 1, supra note 1, at 1.
5. Id. at 9.
6. Id. at 10.
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tion between the adjoining state and province.7
Increased trade will benefit the economies on both sides of
the border. However, with the increased trade, disputes will
inevitably increase. The parties involved will want a speedy,
fair, and efficient method of settling these disputes. A final
judgment, enforceable in either state or province, is one means
of improving the process.
On July 5, 1989, the Executive Council of the Province of
British Columbia passed an Order in Council declaring the
State of Washington the first American "reciprocating state'
8
for purposes of Part 2 of British Columbia's Court Order
Enforcement Act.9 As a result, subject to certain require-
ments, most judgments of Washington State courts are now
more easily and quickly recognized and enforced by the British
Columbia Supreme Court.' °
The order was the result of a formal request from the
Washington State Attorney General to the Attorney General
for British Columbia.1  The request was prompted by
problems, real and anticipated, in litigation involving Washing-
ton and British Columbia residents.
Prior to this declaration, successful litigants whose
attempts to enforce Washington judgments in British Colum-
bia were unsuccessful were required to commence new pro-
ceedings in British Columbia courts. Such relitigation is
particularly problematic in commercial transactions where the
delay and added expense can be devastating. Therefore, by
reducing the probability of relitigation, reciprocity will facili-
7. For example, it has been calculated that tariffs on Washingt6n's wine, beer,
poultry, and dairy products made these items up to 57% more expensive in Canada. Id.
8. Order of the Lt. Governor in Council, Order in Council No. 980 (July 5, 1989)
[hereinafter Order].
On the recommendation of the undersigned, the Administrator, by and with
the advice and consent of the Executive Council, orders that, being satisfied
that reciprocal provisions are made by Washington State (one of the United
States of America), Washington State is declared to be a reciprocating state
for purposes of Part 2 of the Court Order Enforcement Act.
9. Court Order Enforcement Act, B.C. REV. STAT. ch. 75, §§ 30-41 (1979).
10. At the outset, however, it is important to note that the Court Order
Enforcement Act only offers "a speedy method of enforcement of those judgments
that are enforceable." Swan, The Canadian Constitution, Federalism and the Conflict
of Laws, 63 CAN. B. REV. 271, 273 (1985). The potential enforcement problems will be
discussed in Part III of this Article.
11. Letter from Kenneth 0. Eikenberry, Washington State Attorney General, to
Brian Smith, British Columbia Attorney General (Oct. 2, 1987).
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tate the expansion of trade and commerce between Washing-
ton and British Columbia.
Part I of this Article will discuss the importance of foreign
judgment enforcement. In Part II, the procedural require-
ments of enforcing a Washington judgment in British Colum-
bia will be outlined. Finally, in Part III, potential enforcement
problems for Washington judgment creditors under British
Columbia's Court Order Enforcement Act will be considered.
I. THE ABILITY TO ENFORCE JUDGMENTS IN A FOREIGN
FORUM IS CRITICAL FOR WASHINGTON JUDGMENT
CREDITORS
The last stage in a fully litigated legal dispute is the collec-
tion of the judgment by the prevailing party. Even when liti-
gation and judgment enforcement occur in a single jurisdiction,
this can be the most difficult step in the litigation process. The
problem is compounded when a litigant attempts to enforce a
judgment in another country. Enforcement problems might be
alleviated by a contractual choice of forum clause.12 If, for
example, the parties choose Washington as the forum jurisdic-
tion, the parties will litigate under the law of the state of
Washington. Ultimately, however, any Washington judgment
obtained by a prevailing plaintiff will have to be enforced in
the jurisdiction where the defendant's assets are located.
It has long been possible to enforce the judgments of Brit-
ish Columbia courts in Washington under Washington's Uni-
form Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act.13 However,
prior to the recent order made under British Columbia's Court
Order Enforcement Act, Washington judgment creditors tak-
ing Washington judgments to British Columbia courts have
had difficulty enforcing those judgments. British Columbia
courts often simply refused to recognize the Washington judg-
ments because the provincial government did not recognize
Washington as a reciprocating state. Washington judgment
creditors were forced either to forego collecting the debt or to
relitigate the case in a British Columbia court. Fortunately,
12. Choice of forum clauses are negotiated between the contracting parties. Under
the British Columbia approach to enforcement of foreign judgments, where a
judgment debtor has contracted to submit himself to the forum in which the judgment
was obtained, the judgment will be enforced by the British Columbia courts. Weiner v.
Singh, 22 C.P.C. 230, 234 (B.C. County Ct. 1981) (quoting Emmanuel v. Symon, 1 K.B.
302, 309 (1908)).
13. See WASH. REV. CODE § 6.40.010-.915 (1989).
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the task of enforcing Washington judgments in British Colum-
bia courts will be easier now that Washington is a reciprocating
state under British Columbia's Court Order Enforcement
Act. 1
4
A. The Need for Recognition by the Foreign Court
In order to enforce a foreign judgment, a court must first
recognize the judgment.'" Historically, principles of sover-
eignty have made some courts reluctant to recognize judg-
ments rendered by the courts of foreign nations. 6 There is a
tension between the need to protect sovereign interests and
the need for universal recognition of foreign judgments:
The principle of territorial sovereignty is said to prevent for-
eign judgments from having any direct operation as such in
any of the Canadian provinces. This attitude is principally
due to a lack of confidence in other legal systems. It may be
difficult for the enforcing court to ascertain the indepen-
dence and legal ability of the foreign judge, and to assess the
reliability of the foreign legal system .... To admit the prin-
ciple of universal recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments would result in recognizing in a foreign judge a
power superior in many instances to that possessed by the
local legislature. For these reasons adequate safeguards
must be provided. On the other hand a foreign judgment is
a fact which cannot be ignored.17
By ignoring foreign judgments, courts prejudice the inter-
ests of foreign creditors who, like all creditors, want to protect
themselves against the risk of their debtor's insolvency or any
other impediment to the enforcement of their claims.'" A sec-
ondary effect of nonrecognition by a state is that it makes it
less likely that the foreign forum will recognize the judgments
of that state.' 9
The United States and Canada are similar in that enforce-
14. Court Order Enforcement Act, B.C. REV. STAT. ch. 75 (1979).
15. Castel, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Personam and
in Rem in the Common Law Provinces of Canada, 17 MCGILL L.J. 11, 12 (1971).
16. See id. at 11.
17. Id.
18. See Juenger, The Recognition of Money Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 4 (1988).
19. For example, in the case of Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), the United
States Supreme Court stated "that judgments rendered in France, or in any other
foreign country by the laws of which our own judgments are reviewable upon the
merits, are not entitled to full credit and conclusive effect when sued upon in this
[Vol. 13:491
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ment of foreign judgments is not expressly governed by federal
law in either country. Instead, state law in the United States,
and provincial law in Canada, govern the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments.2 °
B. Use of State or Provincial Legislation to Aid in Enforcing
Foreign Judgments
In 1975, the Washington State Legislature enacted the
Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act.2 ' The
legislature, by this enactment, attempted to ease enforcement
of British Columbia judgments in Washington.22 Under the
Act, the expectation was that British Columbia would recipro-
cate and Washington judgment creditors would be able to
enforce Washington judgments in British Columbia.21 Unfor-
tunately, mere passage of the Act proved insufficient. Unlike
the Act, British Columbia's Court Order Enforcement Act
requires each foreign state to be separately declared a recipro-
cating state.24
In 1987, the Washington State Attorney General formally
requested that British Columbia issue an Order in Council rec-
ognizing Washington as a reciprocating state.25 To become a
country, but are prima facie evidence only of the justice of the plaintiff's claim." Id. at
227. See also Juenger, supra note 18, at 31-33.
20. At least one commentator, however, sees the United States as providing more
of a federal framework for resolution of conflict of laws questions regarding
enforcement of judgments. The reason for this is that jurisdictional issues are framed
in terms of "constitutional" issues that can be applied across the nation rather than on
a strictly province by province basis as is the case in Canada. Swan, supra note 10, at
272.
21. WASH. REV. CODE § 6.40.010-.915 (1989).
22. See id.
23. Although British Columbia is not specifically mentioned in RCW 6.40, one
of the principal reasons for enacting that law was the situation between the
State of Washington and British Columbia. The bill was intended to rectify
immediately the problem of British Columbia's nonrecognition of Washington
judgments because of its reciprocity requirement. (House Judiciary
Committee Bill Analysis for ESB 2108, 5-14-75).
Memorandum from Diane Noda, Legal Intern, House Judiciary Committee, to Repre-
sentative Pat McMullen (July 16, 1987).
24. "Where the Lieutenant Governor in Council is satisfied that reciprocal
provisions will be made by a state in or outside Canada for the enforcement of
judgments given in the Province, he may by order declare it to be a reciprocating state
for this Part." Court Order Enforcement Act, B.C. REV. STAT. ch. 75, § 39(1) (1979)
(emphasis added).
25. Letter from Kenneth 0. Eikenberry, Washington State Attorney General, to
Brian Smith, British Columbia Attorney General, (Oct. 2, 1987). The Washington
State Attorney General's Office is currently trying to establish the same reciprocating
state status with other Canadian provinces.
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reciprocating state, as the term is used in British Columbia's
Court Order Enforcement Act, Washington first had to meet
the British Columbia requirement that it recognize and
enforce judgments of British Columbia courts. Washington's
adoption of the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Enforce-
ment Act met this requirement. Thus, British Columbia com-
plied with the Attorney General's request and the Order in
Council became effective on July 6, 1989.26 Consequently,
Washington now enjoys reciprocating state status.
Under British Columbia's Court Order Enforcement Act, a
* Washington judgment creditor must apply to the British
Columbia Supreme Court to register the Washington judg-
ment. Normally, the judgment will be registered if the appli-
cation is in the proper form and no defects existed in the
original proceeding. The possible defects are set out in section
31 of the Court Order Enforcement Act.
A British Columbia court will not register a judgment if
the original court acted without jurisdiction, without authority
to adjudicate the cause of action, or without the ability to hold
the judgment debtor liable.2 A determination that the origi-
nal court lacked jurisdiction over the judgment debtor reflects
either that the judgment debtor was not carrying on business
within the jurisdiction of the original court or was not a resi-
dent of the state of the original court. In either situation, if
the judgment debtor did not appear or submit 29 to the jurisdic-
tion of the original *court, the British Columbia court will find
that personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor was lack-
ing and the judgment will not be registered." Additionally, if
the judgment debtor was not duly served with process of the
original court or did not appear, a judgment may not be
registered.
These requirements are similar to those of Washington's
Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act. In order
to enforce a judgment under Washington's Act, the plaintiff
must show that, in the original action, the rendering court had
both subject matter jurisdiction and jurisdiction over the par-
ties or the res.31
26. Order, supra note 8.
27. Court Order Enforcement Act, B.C. REV. STAT. ch. 75, § 31(6)(a)-(g) (1979).
28. Id. § 31(6).
29. See Castell, supra note 15, at 30-45.
30. But see infra text accompanying notes 91-102.
31. WASH. REV. CODE § 6.40.040(1)(b)-(c) (1989).
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Furthermore, both Acts impose three additional require-
ments before a foreign judgment will be registered. First, the
judgment must not have been obtained by fraud.32 Second, the
judgment must be final and conclusive.33 Finally, the judg-
ment must not violate public policy in the eyes of the Washing-
ton or British Columbia court.3" The two acts are also similar
in that neither act applies to judgments for alimony or child
support.35
The one major difference between the two acts is the
requirement, found only in British Columbia's Court Order
Enforcement Act, allowing the British Columbia court to
refuse recognition if the "judgment debtor would have had a
good defence if an action were brought on the judgment."36
This provision may cause delay in obtaining recognition or it
may require relitigation of the case in British Columbia.
Thus, although some problems may still be encountered by
a Washington judgment creditor, the inclusion of Washington
as a reciprocating state under British Columbia's Court Order
Enforcement Act greatly increases the likelihood that Wash-
ington judgments will be enforced. However, to prevail in an
enforcement proceeding, the procedure for registering Wash-
32. Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act, Id. § 6.40.040(2)(b);
Court Order Enforcement Act, B.C. REV. STAT. ch. 75, § 31(6)(d) (1979).
33. Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act, WASH. REV. CODE
§ 6.40.020 (1989); Court Order Enforcement Act, B.C. REV. STAT. ch. 75, § 31(6)(e)
(1979). The British Columbia statute requires either that an appeal must not be
pending or that the time for appeal must have expired.
34. Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act, WASH. REV. CODE
§ 6.40.040(2)(c) (1989); Court Order Enforcement Act, B.C. REV. STAT. ch. 75, § 31(6)(f)
(1979).
35. Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act, WASH. REV. CODE
§ 6.40.010(2) (1989); Court Order Enforcement Act, B.C. REV. STAT. ch. 75, § 30(1)
(1979).
36. Court Order Enforcement Act, B.C. REV. STAT. ch. 75, § 31(6)(g) (1979).
The term "good defence" is not specifically defined either in the statute or in
British Columbia case law. After acknowledging that the law on this matter differs in
the various Canadian provinces, Justice McIntyre of the British Columbia Supreme
Court attempted to define what the phrase means in the law of British Columbia:
Generally speaking apart from statutory defences, the foreign judgment will
be enforceable unless it is shown that it was obtained by fraud, that it is
contrary to natural justice or that it is repugnant to public policy . ...
However, in my view, there is available a fourth defence in the Province of
British Columbia. I refer to Boyle v. Victoria Yukon Trading Co. (1902), 9
B.C.R. 213, as authority for the proposition that our courts will refuse to
enforce a foreign judgment taken by default where manifest error in the
judgment is shown.
Re Gacs and Maierovitz, 68 D.L.R.2d 345, 350-51 (1968) (emphasis added). See infra
text accompanying notes 61-68.
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ington judgments in British Columbia must be carefully
followed.
II. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTERING A
WASHINGTON JUDGMENT IN BRITISH COLUMBIA
To enforce a Washington judgment in British Columbia, a
judgment creditor must first apply to the British Columbia
Supreme Court37 for registration within six years of the date of
the judgment.3 This application must include a certificate
from the court which issued the judgment.3 9 This certificate
37. The British Columbia Supreme Courts are a division of courts that hear trial
level cases. Supreme Court Act, B.C. REV. STAT. ch. 397, § 8 (1979). The British
Columbia Court of Appeal is the equivalent of the Washington State Supreme Court.
Court of Appeal Act, S.B.C. ch. 7, § 6 (1982).
38. Court Order Enforcement Act, B.C. REV. STAT. ch. 75, § 31(1) (1979).




Province of British Columbia
It is certified that, among the records of the court of - , at - , before
the Honorable -, a justice [judge] of the court, in the Procedure Book
there is record of an action, numbered as No. -. , between - (plaintiff(s))
and - (defendant(s)).
1. The writ of summons [or statement of claim, as the case may be] was
issued on - [month, day], 19-..__, and proof was furnished to this court that
it was served on the defendant by delivery of a copy of it to him and leaving it
with him.
2. No defence was entered, and the judgment was allowed by [proof,
default or order]
[OR]
2. A defence was entered and judgement was allowed at the trial [or as
the case may be]
3. Judgment was given on - [month, day], 19-
4. Time for appeal has expired and no appeal is pending [or an appeal
against the judgment was made and was dismissed by the Court of Appeal and
the time for any further appeal has expired and no further appeal is pending,
or as the case may be].
5. Further details if any.
6. Particulars:
Claim as allowed $




And the balance remaining due on the judgment for debt, interest and
costs is $ -
In testimony of which we have fixed the seal of the court at
[month, day], 19_.
[Seal] A Justice [Judge] of the Court of
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must be signed by either a Washington judge ordering the
judgment or the court clerk, and the seal of the issuing court
must be affixed to it. 40 The certificate must also include assur-
ances (1) that the defendant was properly served, (2) that
either the defendant defaulted or was adjudged at fault, and
(3) that the judgment is no longer subject to appeal.4' Addi-
tionally, the certificate must state the amount of the claim
which was allowed, the costs incurred which are included in
the judgment and the amount of interest accrued.42
It is technically permissible to use a form different from
that prescribed. If the required information is included in a
form different from that described in the statute, the proposed
certificate is acceptable so long as the court seal and the
required signatures appear on the certificate.43
In addition to having a certificate of judgment, the applica-
tion for registration of the judgment must also be accompanied
by an affidavit in support of the application.4 The affidavit
must exhibit a certified copy of the judgment under the seal of
the court which issued the judgment. Additionally, the person
signing the affidavit must state to the best of his belief:
(i) that the judgment creditor is entitled to enforce the
judgment;
45
(ii) that the judgment does not fall within any of the cases in
which, under section 31 of the Court Order Enforcement Act, a
judgment cannot be registered;46
Or
Clerk of the Court of




43. Lornal Constr. v. Lawrence, 47 C.P.C. 99, 105 (1984 B.C.S.C.).
44. B.C. SUP. CT. R. 54(2). In a recent case, the British Columbia Supreme Court
set aside the registration of a judgment because the affidavits did not meet the
requirements of Rule 54. Lornal, 47 C.P.C. at 105. In Lornal, the court noted that
"[t]he affidavit in support of the registration does not meet the requirements of any of
the four numbered paragraphs of the Rule." Id. The deponent had not stated that, to
the best of his belief, the judgment creditor was entitled to enforce the judgment, nor
did he state that the judgment did not fall within any of the circumstances in which it
could not be registered. Furthermore, he did not state the names and addresses of the
judgment debtor and creditor nor did he state the amount presently owing on the
judgment. Id. at 104.
45. B.C. Sup. CT. R. 54(2)(b)(i).
46. B.C. Sup. CT. R. 54(2)(b)(ii). The reasons for which a judgment cannot be
registered are those listed in Court Order Enforcement Act, B.C. REV. STAT. ch. 75,
§ 31(6)(a)-(g) (1979).
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(iii) the full name, trade or business, and usual or last known
place of abode or business of the judgment creditor and judg-
ment debtor respectively, so far as is known to the deponent;47
and
(iv) the amount presently owing on the judgment.48
Furthermore, the order for registering the judgment must
be in the proper form.49 In most cases, the application is made
ex parte. Where it is made ex parte the order must state that
the defendant is given one month from the time he has notice
of the registration to apply to set the registration aside. 0
After the procedural requirements are satisfied, the Brit-
ish Columbia court will review the substance of the judgment
according to the substantive requirements of the Court Order
Enforcement Act.
III. BRITISH COLUMBIA SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF
WASHINGTON JUDGMENTS: POTENTIAL APPLICATION
PROBLEMS
Under section 31(6) of the Court Order Enforcement
Act,51 there are seven circumstances in which registration will
not be granted. 2 The burden is on the judgment debtor to
47. B.C. Sup. CT. R. 54(2)(b)(iii).
48. B.C. Sup. CT. R. 54(2)(b)(i)-(iv).
49. This form, Form 59, can be found in Appendix A of the British Columbia
Court Rules. The information required on the form includes the date and sum of
judgment and the court that entered the judgment.
ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO REGISTER FOREIGN JUDGMENT
(Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act)
Before the Honorable Mr. (Justice) the - day of - , 19-.. Upon the
Application of - coming on before me on __ and upon hearing
Counsel for the applicant, and -, Counsel for _ :
This Court orders that the judgment dated the - day of - , 19_,
of [name of court] whereby it was adjudged that [name and address of
judgment creditor] recover from [judgment debtor] the sum of $_. for debt
[or as the case may be] and $____ for costs, be registered in this Court.
[Add order if obtained ex parte].
This Court further orders that the [judgment debtor] may apply to set
aside the registration within one month after he has notice of it.
By the Court.
Registrar
B.C. SUP. CT. R. 54(3) app. A, Form 59.
50. See id.
51. B.C. REV. STAT. ch. 75, § 31(6) (1979).
52. (6) No order for registration shall be made if the court to which
application for registration is made is satisfied that
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prove that any of the listed circumstances exist,53 as the judg-
ment of the original court constitutes prima facie evidence of
the debt.' The first three circumstances involve questions of
jurisdiction and notice. The remaining four circumstances
involve nonjurisdictional issues.
A. Nonjurisdictional Requirements
First, fraud, as referred to in the Court Order Enforce-
ment Act,55 deals with fraud in obtaining the judgment rather
than fraud as related to the original cause of action.
A judgment obtained by fraud may be impeached, but it is
extrinsic fraud, that is, a fraud of the type which deprives a
person of an adequate opportunity to present his case in
court which will vitiate a judgment. It is not fraud.., which
is intrinsic fraud .... that is, allegations going to the exist-
ence and substance of the cause of action.56
(a) the original court acted either
(i) without jurisdiction under the conflict of laws rules of the
court to which application is made; or
(ii) without authority, under the law in force in the state where
the judgment was made, to adjudicate concerning the cause of
action or subject matter that resulted in the judgment or
concerning the person of the judgment debtor;
(b) the judgment debtor, being a person who was neither carrying on
business nor ordinarily resident in the state of the original court,
did not voluntarily appear or otherwise submit during the
proceedings to the jurisdiction of that court;
(c) the judgment debtor, being the defendant in the proceedings, was
not duly served with the process of the original court and did not
appear, notwithstanding that he was ordinarily resident or was
carrying on business in the state of that court or had agreed to
submit to the jurisdiction of that court;
(d) the judgment was obtained by fraud;
(e) an appeal is pending or the time in which an appeal may be taken
has not expired;
(f) the judgment was for a cause of action that for reasons of public
policy or for some similar reason would not have been entertained
by the registering court; or
(g) the judgment debtor would have a good defence if an action were
brought on the judgment.
Court Order Enforcement Act, B.C. REV. STAT. ch. 75, § 31(6)(a)-(g) (1979).
53. [T]he onus is on the respondents who seek to have the judgment set aside
to satisfy the judge as to the grounds set forth in § 31(6). Unless they do so,
the judgment, being prima facie proof of the debt, is entitled as a matter of
comity, and by the provisions of the Act, to recognition and to registration.
Roglass Consultants v. Kennedy, 65 B.C.L.R. 393, 394 (1984).
54. Id.
55. B.C. REV. STAT. ch. 75, § 31(6)(d) (1979).
56. Rog/ass, 65 B.C.L.R. at 396.
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Second, the judgment cannot be subject to appeal.
Third, the judgment cannot be for a cause of action which
would not be enforceable in British Columbia for public policy
reasons articulated in the province." The British Columbia
Supreme Court, however, has noted that merely because an
action would fail in that province does not mean that an appli-
cation to register that judgment would fail, so long as the judg-
ment was validly obtained.5" While a default judgment may be
set aside,59 the judgment is still a final judgment while it
stands. Finality is defined as whether the judgment "can only
be questioned in an appeal to a higher tribunal."'
Finally, the foreign judgment will not be registered if the
judgment debtor has a good defense to an action brought on
the judgment.61 While defining a "good defence," is not a par-
ticularly easy task, at least one recent British Columbia case
addressed the issue.62
In Central Trust Co. v. Messenger, Milchem and
Milchem,"3 the judgment debtor claimed a right of set-off
against the creditor. The judgment debtor claimed that the
57. Court Order Enforcement Act, B.C. REV. STAT. ch. 75, § 31(6)(f) (1979). An
example of a case in which a British Columbia court found that the public policy of the
province had not been offended is Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Brown, 3
B.C.L.R.2d 270 (1986). In Brown, an Alberta judgment creditor brought the original
action in an Alberta court to enforce a chattel mortgage. The cause of action in the
Alberta court was based on an action that could not have been maintained in a British
Columbia court. Specifically, British Columbia law states that the grantee of a chattel
mortgage may seize the chattel or "sue to enforce his rights but may not do both." Id.
at 271. One of the chattels had been seized before the judgment, so an action on the
chattel could not be maintained in a British Columbia court. Id.
The British Columbia court, to which application for registration of the Alberta
judgment was made, found that while the laws of British Columbia and Alberta were
different, the Alberta law did not offend the public policy of British Columbia.
Consequently, the judgment was registered. Id.
The Washington courts approach the issue of alleged violations of public policy in
a manner similar to that of the British Columbia courts. The Washington Court of
Appeals explained that "[t]he public policy of this state is found in its constitution,
statutes and settled rules laid down by its courts; however, just because there is a
difference between the laws of a foreign state and this state is not sufficient by itself to
establish a violation of this state's public policy." Untersteiner v. Untersteiner, 32
Wash. App. 859, 863 n.3, 650 P.2d 256, 259 n.3 (1982) (emphasis added) (citing
Richardson v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 11 Wash. 2d 288, 301, 118 P.2d 985, 991 (1941).
58. Brown, 3 B.C.L.R.2d at 272.
59. Boyle v. Victoria Yukon Trading Co., 9 B.C.R. 213, 222 (1902) (quoting Lord
Herschell in Nouvion v. Freeman, 15 App. Cas. 1, 9 (1889)).
60. Id.
61. Court Order Enforcement Act, B.C. REV. STAT. ch. 75, § 31(6)(g) (1979).
62. See Re Gacs and Maierovitz, 68 D.L.R.2d 345 (1968).
63. 33 B.C.L.R.2d 34 (1988).
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Alberta judgment at issue should not be registered in British
Columbia because the claimed right of set-off was a good
defense to the judgment and further that the defense had not
been available in the original Alberta action.' The British
Columbia court found that the judgment debtor had no right of
set-off against the judgment creditor. Accordingly, the British
Columbia judge dismissed the application to set aside the
registration. 5
The decision in Central Trust sheds some light on the
question of what constitutes a good defense. First, the defense
raised must be one that could not have been raised in the origi-
nal action." Additionally, the defense must be one that could
have been raised had the original action been litigated in Brit-
ish Columbia." Since the defense raised in the Central Trust
case could not have been raised in either Alberta or British
Columbia, the defense of set-off was not effective.8
The nonjurisdictional conditions imposed by section 31(6)
of the Court Order Enforcement Act allow the judgment
debtor to impeach the judgment of the issuing court. When
the judgment debtor challenges a foreign judgment on the
grounds of fraud, public policy considerations, or inability to
raise a good defense, the registering court may examine the
original proceeding for possible defects.69 However, if the reg-
istering court finds no defects in the substantive method by
which the judgment was obtained, the judgment debtor may
also challenge the judgment on the basis of possible jurisdic-
tional defects.
B. Jurisdictional Requirements
The jurisdictional requirements are found in the first
three paragraphs of section 31(6).7" Paragraph (a) requires
that the Washington court have jurisdiction under either the
64. Id. at 37.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. In Pos v. Pos, 61 B.C.L.R. 388 (1985), the court found that while a claim of set-
off could be pleaded as a defense in some cases, the evidence must establish such a
claim before it can be used as a good defense. The court in Pos found that the evidence
had not established the claim of set-off and, therefore, the defendant debtor did not
have a good defense. Id. at 395.
68. Central Trust, 33 B.C.L.R.2d at 37.
69. Re Gacs and Maierovitz, 68 D.L.R.2d 345, 350 (1968).
70. Court Order Enforcement Act, B.C. REV. STAT. ch. 75, § 31(6)(a)-(c) (1979); see
supra note 52 (providing text of statute).
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British Columbia conflict of laws rules or the law of Washing-
ton.71 Under paragraph (c), the judgment debtor must have
been a resident or have been carrying on business in the State
of Washington. Further, the judgment debtor must either have
been "duly served" or have voluntarily appeared in the original
action,72 but the judgment debtor need not have received per-
sonal service under this section.73
The jurisdictional requirements of paragraphs (a) and (c)
do not present major difficulties for the Washington judgment
creditor. Paragraph (a) simply requires that the Washington
court have subject matter jurisdiction over the cause of action
and personal jurisdiction over the defendant debtor. Para-
graph (c) only requires that the Washington court have per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant debtor, by way of the
defendant either residing or carrying on business in the state,
and that the defendant is duly served.
Conversely, the voluntary appearance requirement of par-
agraph (b) may present some difficulty for the Washington
judgment creditor. Paragraph (b) states that if the judgment
debtor was neither carrying on business nor ordinarily residing
in the state of the original court and did not voluntarily appear
or submit 74 during the proceedings to the jurisdiction of the
original court, then the judgment will not be recognized.7 5 The
traditional common law rule, codified in this paragraph, is
rather narrow.76 Until recently, most British Columbia courts
have strictly construed this jurisdictional rule.
One example of such strict construction is found in Wei-
ner v. Singh.77 In Weiner, a California resident was involved
in an automobile accident with the defendant in California.7
At the time of the accident, the defendant was a resident of
71. Id. § 31(6)(a).
72. Id. § 31(6)(c).
73. In Re Gacs and Maierovitz, 68 D.L.R.2d 345 (1968), the defendant debtor
received substituted service when an officer of the sheriff's office left an order for
substituted service at the defendant's residence. Id. at 347. The court reasoned that
the term "duly served" in the statute rather than "personal service," as used in other
parts of the statute, showed an intention by the legislature that "personal service" was
not required under paragraph (c). Id.
74. Court Order Enforcement Act, B.C. REV. STAT. ch. 75, § 31(6)(b) (1979); see
supra note 52 (providing text of statute).
75. Id.
76. Swan, supra note 10, at 273.
77. 22 C.P.C. 230 (1981).
78. Id. at 232.
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the State of California.79 However, when the action was com-
menced in California almost three years later, the defendant
was a resident of British Columbia.8 ° The defendant was
served in British Columbia, but the defendant never appeared
in the California action."' A default judgment was subse-
quently obtained by the California plaintiff.82
When presented with the California judgment, the British
Columbia court refused to recognize the judgment.83 The court
based its decision on the general rule regarding enforcement of
foreign judgments found in the leading case of Emanuel v.
Symon. 4
In actions in personan there are five cases in which the
Courts of this country will enforce a foreign judgment: (1)
where the defendant is a subject of a foreign country in
which the judgment has been obtained; (2) where he was
resident in the foreign country when the action began; (3)
where the defendant in the character of a plaintiff has
selected the forum in which he is afterwards sued; (4) where
he has voluntarily appeared; and (5) where he has con-
tracted to submit himself to the forum in which the judg-
ment was obtained.85
The Weiner court found the Emanuel rule applicable to
the California judgment. The defendant was not present in
California when the action was commenced, and the defendant
had neither voluntarily appeared in the action nor had he in
any other way submitted to the jurisdiction of the California
court. Consequently, the California court did not have jurisdic-
tion over the defendant under paragraph (b), and the judgment
could not be registered.
8 6
Traditionally, the jurisdictional rule from Emanuel has
also been applied to cases involving actions between residents
of different Canadian provinces. In In Re Royal Bank of Can-
ada," a British Columbia court set aside an ex parte order
79. Id. at 233.
80. Id. at 232
81. Id. at 233.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 238.
84. 1 K.B. 302 (1908).
85. Weiner, 22 C.P.C. at 234 (citing Emanuel, 1 K.B. at 309). For further analysis
of these five circumstances in which judgments will be enforced, see Castel, supra note
17, at 31-46.
86. Weiner, 22 C.P.C. at 238.
87. 3 W.W.R. 449 (1982).
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directing registration of an Ontario judgment. The British
Columbia court had previously ordered registration of the
Ontario judgment, and the British Columbia judgment debtor's
wages had been garnished."8 In response to a motion, the regis-
tration of the Ontario judgment was set aside pursuant to sec-
tion 31(6)(b) of the Court Order Enforcement Act.89 The
judgment debtor was not present in Ontario when the action
was commenced and had not submitted to the jurisdiction of
the Ontario court.90 Therefore, the Ontario court did not have
jurisdiction according to a literal interpretation of paragraph
(b).
This strict construction of paragraph (b) has been relaxed
in recent cases involving judgments from Canadian provinces.
In Marcotte v. Megson,91 the British Columbia judge was con-
fronted with an Alberta judgment arising from a case in which
the British Columbia judgment debtor claimed that he was not
present in Alberta at the commencement of the original pro-
ceeding, nor did he submit to the jurisdiction of the Alberta
court.9 2 Nevertheless, the court, after an extensive analysis,
allowed registration of the judgment.
The judge first considered the rules of the Alberta and
British Columbia courts which provide for extraterritorial ser-
vice in certain situations.93 In both cases, extraterritorial ser-
vice is permitted in breach of contract actions.94 In Marcotte,
the defendant was personally served in British Columbia pur-
suant to an order of the Alberta court where the action was
commenced.95 The defendant did not file a statement of
defense, and a default judgment was entered by the Alberta
court for unpaid wages owed the plaintiff.96 The judgment
debtor applied to have the Alberta judgment set aside based
upon a lack of personal jurisdiction in the original
proceeding.
9 7
The British Columbia court found that, despite the defend-
ant's claim of lack of personal jurisdiction, the judgment could
88. Id. at 450.
89. Id. at 452.
90. Id. at 450.
91. 19 B.C.L.R.2d 300 (1987).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 304-05.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 302.
96. Id. at 305.
97. Id. at 306.
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be registered in British Columbia. The court based its decision
on the fact that as between Canadian provinces, the courts of
British Columbia should recognize a jurisdictional basis that a
British Columbia court would claim.98 This principle is
referred to as "jurisdictional reciprocity.
99
The principle of jurisdictional reciprocity has been dis-
cussed at length both in the Canadian literature0 ° and in sev-
eral British Columbia cases involving foreign judgment
enforcement. Most recently, discussion of the principle
appears in Morguard Investments Ltd. v. DeSavoye.1°1
Morguard involved a British Columbia judgment debtor
who attempted to have an Alberta judgment set aside on the
grounds that the Alberta court that ordered the judgment
lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant.0 2 In response,
the court reasoned that the rule stated in section 31(6)(b) of
the Court Order Enforcement Act should be expanded to
include recognition of judgments in cases where the principle
of jurisdictional reciprocity applies.10 3 In effect, the court
rejected the strict application of the traditional rule found in
paragraph (b). The court, however, limited its decision to cases
involving judgments from Canadian provinces. 10 4
Because Morguard limited the application of the new rule
to Canadian judgments, Washington creditors may still
encounter the same problem that confronted the California
judgment creditor in Weiner. The traditional rule in Eman-
uel, as expressed in section 31(6)(b) of the Court Order
Enforcement Act, may still be a barrier to enforcement.
Therefore, the possibility remains that a Washington judgment
will not be recognized if the British Columbia judgment debtor
was not present in Washington at the time the Washington
action was commenced or if he did not voluntarily appear or
submit to the jurisdiction of the Washington court.
However, the fact that Washington is now a reciprocating
state under the Court Order Enforcement Act creates a strong
argument in favor of applying the new rule to Washington
98. Id. at 314-17.
99. Id. at 314.
100. See, e.g., Gilbert, Reciprocity in the Recognition of Foreign Judgments, 32
CAN. B. REV. 359, 379 (1954).
101. 27 B.C.L.R.2d 155 (1988).
102. Id. at 157.
103. Id. at 163.
104. Id. at 160.
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judgments. Since Washington is the first American state to
become a reciprocating state, the question, if it should arise,
will be one of first impression. Dictum in Weiner suggests
that Washington's new status as a reciprocating state may enti-
tle Washington judgments to more favorable treatment under
the modern rule stated in Morguard.
In Weiner, the judge stated, "In my opinion Emanuel v.
Symon applies unless reciprocating states have been created by
statutes such as our Court Order Enforcement Act."' 0' Wash-
ington judgments may be entitled to treatment under the mod-
ern rule of "reciprocal jurisdiction" rather than the common
law rule articulated in Emanuel.
Because paragraph (b) may still be a barrier to enforce-
ment in the case of a defendant who does not submit to the
jurisdiction of the Washington court, individuals who contract
with British Columbia residents should take precautionary
measures, such as providing a choice of forum clause in the
contract. According to the rule in Emanuel, if the defendant
has contracted to submit himself to the forum in which the
judgment was obtained, then the defendant has submitted to
the jurisdiction of that court.' 6 By placing a choice of forum
clause in the contract, the Washington judgment creditor can
avoid any jurisdictional problems that might be raised by the
judgment debtor under section 31(6)(b) of the Court Order
Enforcement Act.
IV. CONCLUSION
The recent recognition of Washington as a reciprocating
state under British Columbia's Court Order Enforcement Act
should make it much easier to enforce Washington judgments
in British Columbia. The ease of enforcing valid Washington
judgments in British Columbia will be beneficial to Washing-
ton creditors specifically and to Washington-British Columbia
commerce generally. If followed closely, the various proce-
dural requirements of the Court Order Enforcement Act
should cause few difficulties for Washington judgment credi-
tors. While some substantive problems may arise in a dispute
between a Washington judgment holder and a British Colum-
bia defendant, the British Columbia courts should now allow
105. Weiner v. Singh, 22 C.P.C. 230, 238 (1981).
106. Id. at 234.
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Washington judgments the same force and weight as judg-
ments from other Canadian provinces.
